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'You scratch my back and I scratch yours' versus 'love thy neighbour'

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**‘You scratch my back and I scratch yours’
versus
‘Love thy neighbour’**

**Two proximate mechanisms of reciprocal
altruism**

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RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

**‘YOU SCRATCH MY BACK AND I SCRATCH YOURS’
VERSUS
‘LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR’.
TWO PROXIMATE MECHANISMS
OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM**

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